Talk:Battle of France/Archive 2

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Sizes of Air forces

Should the listed sizes of the air forces reflect the amount possessed by France, or the amount actually used? Also, which source provided the strengths that the battlebox lists? The Collapse of the Third Republic gives the sizes as 2700-3000 (Axis) and ~3700 (Allied, if all of the French planes are counted). --Nucleusboy 14:35, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

The Collapse of the Third Republic is a very poor and outdated source. There are many ways to measure these numbers and perhaps it is fundamentally undecidable which way to use. I know for a fact that there does not exist one published single source that gives accurate data on either planes or tanks. The battlebox should best be seen as a rough indication. Many more precise data can be found in the articles about the equipment used.--MWAK 06:42, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

But there is one thing to consider: even German wikipedia says, that the german Luftwaffe was not that superior in terms of numbers when attacking France, Belgium and the NL. Taken from article de:Westfeldzug 1940:

• Luftwaffe
  • modern class fighters (Bf 109, Bf 110): 1120 (900+220)
  • two-engine bombers (Do 17, He 111): 1200
  • dive-bombers (Ju 87): 320
  • assault aircraft (Hs 123): 45
  • => total strength = 2695 modern combat aircraft

• France (according to source Christienne/Lissaraque: Histoire de l'aviation militaire française. p 373 ff.)
  • modern class fighters (D.520, Hawk 75 / Curtiss P-36, Bloch MB.152): ca. 1000 (351+290+<500)
  • two-engine bombers: 1160, of which nevertheless only about 500 would be modern types (LeO 451, Amiot 350, Douglas DB-7, Martin 167)
  • dive-bombers and assault aircraft: ca. 100 (Br.691/693, Vought V-156, Loire-Nieuport LN.411)
  • => total strength = 1600 combat aircraft (counting only modern bombers)

This number is listing only the most modern aircraft of the armee de l'air, even not taking into account the large number of MS.406 fighters (more than 500), that despite of being old and inferior to german fighters scored the biggest amount of french air victories, a ca. 60 Caudron CR.714 fighters that had considerable victories in the hands of polish pilots, and nearly 3000 aircraft of elder types being in second line (Potez 63 series, Bloch MB.210, Bloch MB.131 Amiot 143, large numbers of reconnaissance aircraft). The German article says that a German commission was extremely surprised counting more than 6000 more or less intact aircraft, thousands more being produced in the factories.

• Great Britian
  • modern class fighters: 262
  • bombers: 135
  • => total strength = ca. 400 planes on the continent, being partially inferior to the German ones (Fairey Battle, Gloster Gladiator)

This small number however does not take into account the action of the bomber command aircraft based in Great Britian.

A more 100 planes that could be regarded as modern would come from the Belgian and Dutch air forces.

Regarding all this, Luftwaffe seems not to have been in such a superior position. The problem - as the German article continues - was that the French aircraft often 1. lacked spare parts, 2. lacked trained pilots, 3. were in a poor state of organization and - what may be the most important factor - 4. ofen were put into combat very slowly and carefully. Curiously the most modern units were drawn back to Northern Africa when Germans advanced quickly in the North of France.

There are some experts that the Armee de l'air was rather defeated by its own officers than by the german assault. See for example this link.

-- Hierakares 14:07, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

Well, are you not now comparing German organic strength with the total Allied matériel strength? Also those French planes lower in quality than the "most modern" had only a very marginal capability left. But you are certainly right in claiming that organisational differences were decisive. If the respective sortie rates would have been switched, the Luftwaffe would not have gained air superiority.--MWAK 19:22, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

Maybe we should include some of those facts in the article, which up to now draws a clearly favorite position of Luftwaffe in May 1940, especially in terms of material. I just wonder why other sources, especially the ones cited in german wiki, differ so much from the cited ones (especially E.R Hooton). The book "Kriegstagebuch der Wehrmacht" (book 2), p. 961, talks about 4737 German aircraft in Feb 1940, of which however only 3584 were in service condition (see for a copy of this on my user page). This includes all kinds of gliders, transport and reconnaissance aircraft. The number of 2935 allied aircraft given in the article can only refer to aircraft that was in fact ready for service. However, I wonder if this applies also to the german units. It rather seems to me, that the number 5638 counts all aircraft being in Luftwaffe inventory, not only the ones actually in disposition. Best regards -- Hierakares 09:34, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

Some of this might be made more clear by the discussion below in the "French Air Force strength" section. Certainly the number of 5638 is higher than the number actually committed. The Battle Box numbers always give but a rough indication of strength.--MWAK 18:29, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

French Air Force strength

There was however a materièl reserve of about 3000 aircraft on the continent this is incorrect. These figures were first published by former Air Minister Pierre Cot, who was in office from 1936 on. Cot's point was, basically, to prove that he provided the Armée de l'air with more than enough aircraft, and it was solely the commanders' fault if the Allies did not manage to establish air superiority during the campaign. As said on the French wiki Profondément touché par la défaite française de mai 1940, il essaiera durant sa vie entière d'en comprendre les raisons et de prouver que l'aviation n'est pas le principal artisan de cette défaite.

For a less biased account of the Armée de l'air strenght, we can use Patrick Facon's book as a source. I'll give it a try if nobody does. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by PpPachy (talk • contribs) 16:34, 26 January 2007 (UTC).

Read carefully: it doesn't say this was the French materièl reserve :o) That was about 2000 according to most sources. French operational strength was about 800-900. The numbers I gave are those of all Allies combined. However I agree that the most recent numbers should be mentioned, especially as those sources might well have confused total production numbers with actually available aircraft.--MWAK 17:57, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

We have to balance interpretations like this one by Kirkland:

Possibly because of their disenchantment with the government for using their service as a political toy, the aviators were unable or unwilling to believe that they might be provided with more than a handful of additional aircraft. Thus, when the director of aircraft production advised General Vuillemin, the chief of the air force, in January 1939 that 370 to 600 aircraft per month would come from French factories in 1940, the general said the air force required only 40 to 60. There were not enough aircrews or ground crews for a larger number, and to expand the training program would require the efforts of the entire strength of the air force. In March, Vuillemin agreed to accept 330 aircraft per month. However, even by using forty- to forty-five-year-old reservists to fly in first-line combat units, he could not fully man his units after mobilization. The availability of aircrews became the limiting factor on the number of units that Vuillemin could field, and the physical capacities of his aging pilots became the limiting factor on how frequently the aircraft would fly.

To keep from being buried under the flood of aircraft pouring from the factories, the air staff imposed multiple requirements for modifications, conducted complex acceptance inspections, and kept key components (guns, propellers, and radios) separated from the aircraft on which they were to be installed. Aircraft newly arrived from America were let in their crates. Still the air force received many more aircraft than it could man, and the air staff had to conceal the surfeit from prying parliamentary eyes by dispersing brand-new, combat-ready planes to remote airfields far from the battle zone.

To the contrary, if we go by Facon's interpretation, we have a reserve of just 500 planes :o).--MWAK 20:35, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

Kirkland amazes me, how can people take him seriously when he writes To keep from being buried under the flood of aircraft pouring from the factories, the air staff imposed multiple requirements for modifications, conducted complex acceptance inspections, and kept key components (guns, propellers, and radios) separated from the aircraft on which they were to be installed. Yes, of course, numerous authors have demonstrated how the Armée de l'air's management of new planes effectively acted a bottleneck between factories and operational units. However, there are multiple reasons for this, the most logical for me being the typically French military paranoia. Secret equipment such as radio sets, gunsights and obviously guns were not to be handled by untrustworthy and possibly communist civilians. But to argue that the Armée de l'air set up that bottleneck on purpose is just ludicrous. Vuillemin was painfully aware that his equipment was outdated! On the personnel side of things, of course, the Armée de l'air could not double its size overnight. Older reservists trained on biplanes failed to convert on the new generation of high wing-loading aircraft, and training programs set up after the declaration of war were simply too late for this phase of the war. For more references on the Armée de l'air of the time I suggest reading Ehrenghardt or Facon or Danel - unfortunately little decent stuff has been published in English on the subject. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by PpPachy (talk • contribs) 21:18, 11 February 2007 (UTC).

I can only agree. Indeed, from a quantative point of view French aircraft production was clearly too low: if the training facilities had been adequate they would have lost so many planes through accidents that it would quickly have depleted stocks. BTW, making outlandish claims about the French forces is quite common :o)--MWAK 12:03, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

Victory

It was an Axis victory, but more specifically it was a German victory, the Italians did not enter the war until it was clear that the Germans would win. --Philip Baird Shearer 08:04, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

All very true, but precisely because the German victory was more specific, it is more informative to say it was an Axis victory. For this implies in this context that Germany took part, whereas just saying that it was a German victory obviously doesn't imply Italy took part, a bit of information (often forgotten) which is then lost to the reader. That the German effort was more predominant probably doesn't need to be stressed ;o).--MWAK 08:58, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

As yet I am not persuaded by your line of argument, because it implies that every battle fought in World War II should be labeled either an Axis or Allied victory. I think that is far less informative than crediting the victory to the major participants. Obviously if there is a large proportion of the troops from more than one participating state than it should be labeled an Axis or Allied victory, but not otherwise. "Credit were credit is due" --Philip Baird Shearer 09:13, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, firstly it isn't a matter of credit. It's not the task of an encyclopedia to say things like "Well done, Germany, for beating France". Secondly, if indeed in any battle troops from several nations actually participated, it is more informative to call the reader's attention to this, than only name the major participant, the identity of which will surely be abundantly clear from the article itself.--MWAK 11:35, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

The battle box is meant to be a summary of the article. So if it is abundantly clear from the article then the battle box should say the same thing. Another way of doing it is to count the casualties on both sides. If the number of dead of one of the participating forces is not a significant percentage of the casualties (on their side) then that is a fairly good indicator of how heavily engaged in a battle an ally was. In this case what % of the Axis forces casualties were made up of Italians? --Philip Baird Shearer 17:22, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, when calling it an Axis victory the battle box would say the same thing, given that the context is known. Of course this depends on whether people even know what "Axis" means. I'm personally not very optimistic about this, so perhaps you'r e right when simply calling it a German victory ;o). But the matter is of little importance.--MWAK 18:25, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Battle casualties and Disarmed Enemy Forces

I think the casualties give are incorrect. There is a difference between those captured in battle and those who fall into the hands of the adversary following surrender or mass capitulation. See ICRC Commentaries on the Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Article 5 "Under the present provision, the Convention applies to persons who "fall into the power" of the enemy. This term is also used in the opening sentence of Article 4, replacing the expression "captured" which was used in the 1929 Convention (Article 1). It indicates clearly that the treatment laid down by the Convention is applicable not only to military personnel taken prisoner in the course of fighting, but also to those who fall into the hands of the adversary following surrender or mass capitulation.

So those French soldiers who fell into "hands of the adversary following surrender" are not casualties of the Battle of France and the numbers of casualties should only include those captured during the battle. --Philip Baird Shearer 17:33, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Obviously they aren't casualties as such, as this term simply doesn't include those captured. I presume the battle box heading is "casualties" because "losses" could also include materièl losses. However I'm a bit puzzled by your reference to the convention, the point of its legal norms being precisely that although a distinction could be made between those captured during an immediate fight and those involved in a mass surrender, this distinction is irrelevant to the convention. This does not imply that distinction would, in contrast, be very relevant in other contexts. The real point is however that the number of 1.9 million is indeed the number of French soldiers actually taken prisoner until 25 June 1940. The almost four million men belonging to the French armed forces in metropolitan France that evaded capture are not included.--MWAK 18:13, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Casualties should include those captured, but not those who fall into the hands of the enemy after a general capitulation. The point of quoting GCIII commentary is to show that the distinction does exist in laws of law (and is not a figment of my imagination), so only those captured during the battle should be included in the causality lists not others. I am not sure if the figure should include those captured after June 22, as that is when the article says the fighting stopped. However the article should make it clear that the figure is only those captured up to 25th. BTW what is the source that the numbers are those captured, and that it does not include those who fell into the hands of an enemy power? --Philip Baird Shearer 19:16, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, the article is as yet wrong on this point: the fighting stopped only on 25 June. The Armistice conditions basically stipulated that Germany would not take the remnant prisoner, so there simply was no mass surrender in that sense :o). France was even treated rather harshly in this respect: Germany let go the entire Dutch army.--MWAK 07:40, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

The Germans did violate this specific point of the Armistice, as crews of the Maginot line who had resisted until the end were marched to captivity on July 2nd. PpPachy 09:24, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

This is indeed a notorious incident. Of course the Germans reasoned that in most cases the crews had been in violation of the Armistice themselves, simply by holding out a week beyond the date of its enactment ;o). Then again the crews refused to surrender just because they would go into captivity. There is a bit of a Catch 22 here--MWAK 10:24, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

May 14th air bombings

The air effort above the Meuse Bridgehands around Sedan was almost entirely British, because the Armée de l'air only had approximately 30 bombers available this morning, due to losses of the 3 previous days, and general shortage of modern planes. Therefore the French bomber losses in the area are as follows: one LeO.451 (shot down by fighters) and one Amiot 143. All other bombers lost in the Area were British, Battles and Blenheims of the AASF, plus some Blenheims flying directly from England. It's unfortunate that, while Frieser has seriously researched some of his stuff, there are such weak points in his book. PpPachy 20:59, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

Very true...Thanks for the better info! But were the French fighter losses not very large that day?--MWAK 06:56, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

Historiography

I'm looking over the Historiography article, and for the life of me I can't understand why the term is in such widespread use (or misuse?) all over Wikipedia. From the article:

"Historiography is the study of the practice of history. This can take many forms, including the study of historical method and the historical development of history as an academic discipline. The term can also be used to refer a specific body of historical writing."

Now how is a discussion of the causes of the French defeat historiography? To me, this is merely the study of history, not the study of the study of history. It's not so meta. Am I wrong? Haber 13:55, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, the section, if you go back to study its history :o), started as an attempt to put all kind of theories about the subject safely away under the nomer "Historiography" to hide the fact it was full of unbalanced points of view (now you know why). It then grew considerably — showing it was quite effective in this function :o). Of course a good article really shouldn't need such a section: cause cannot be seperated from effect and if the course of events is adequately described all questions about causality should be answered. However there is in this case indeed an enormous amount of interpretative literature about the subject with distinct phases and fashions, so this article would need a real historiography section. I've recently rewritten much of it, going from top to bottom and in the end I hoped to tackle this particular subject, throwing out those issues adequately decribed and restructuring with proper references those parts that are of a real historiographic nature. Keeping the old title until it is justified by the content would prevent a new one from obstructing the justification process ;o).--MWAK 18:11, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

I still think the content of the section doesn't exactly fit the Merriam-Webster [1] or Wikipedia's own definition of "historiography". However, if you're going to rewrite the section to fit the title then I guess that's just as good as rewriting the title to fit the section. Good luck! Haber 18:36, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Pic miscaptioned

British prisoners

At least four men in this picture are obviously French, including the first of the line. More significantly, this picture isn't at all from Dunkirk, but was actually taken in Veules-les-Roses near St. Valéry-en-Caux. Hard to say from this one, but there are wider views of these prisoners with common background elements, for example here: [2]

(a different one was also published in Militaria Magazine hors-série n°31, Histoire & Collections, 1998, p. 73) By comparing these with both older and recent pictures of Veules-les-Roses as found [3] here, there is no doubt. PpPachy 00:05, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

reserve divisions

Germany did not have 45 Reserve Divisions, which is where the problem arises. Only the sixteen divisions of the 2nd Wave were once known as Reserve Divisions (as they were raised from Reserve regiments). The 20 Divisions of the 3rd wave were Landwehr (formed from Landwehr Regiments). etc. It is very hard for me to tell what those 45 reserve divisions in the West are supposed to represent, particularly if most would not see any real fighting. The term Reserve Divisions really had gone out of use in Germany by the time the war started. Which is why I assume these are the divisions in the Reserve of the OKH (including divisions in formation that number seems about right (39 + 9), though a number of these were not in the West).

By the way, there is no way for German forces to achieve the number of 93 front line divisions without counting the divisions of the 2nd and later waves (the first wave had 39 divisions, including the motorised ones, add 10 Panzer, 1 Cavalry and 3 Mountain (2 in Norway) which leaves you at 53 divisions).--Caranorn 12:22, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Indeed they did not have the official designation "reserve division" and obviously the number of 93 is not the total of prewar active divisions — I hope that this is made quite clear by the text as it is. The number of 45 is debatable; Frieser e.g. uses the number 42. The total of the official OKH reserves, minus 22nd Luftlandedivision, is 39 but the OKH reserves also would be released in response from demands by the Army Groups to increase their operational reserve and had been given a possible destination beforehand. It is for this reason that I objected to the statement that they were in "Strategic Reserve". Not only did they not form a strategic reserve, they also weren't really committed in reponse to considerations on the deeper strategic level. Nevertheless I have to admit that the OKH reserves of course formally were in strategic reserve — though it is not a point, I feel, that should be stressed :o). I'll change the text to clarify.--MWAK 20:01, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Okay I now understand your point. Interestingly enough both sides treated their supposedly strategic reserve (reserve of the OKH and reserve of the GQG) in a similar way, feeding it unit by unit into combat with little strategic planning.--Caranorn 20:50, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Note, I believe more then 5 of those OKH reserve divisions were committed to the frontline armies and corps, but it's quite possible that few saw real action. But to get exact numbers I'd have to annalyse unit presence with the various field armies in June (Verbände und Truppen, though I believe a Schematische Kriegsgliederung of that date also survived), but I believe that would be borderline original research.--Caranorn 20:55, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

You're right: I was focussed too much on May :oS. In June the majority of them was in France and only a third was more or less kept out of the fighting. We'll change it again :o).--MWAK 07:04, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

edit "Aftermath"

Just a short but important note concerning the aftermath of the invasion. After the armistice was signed, France DID want to buy favor of Germany, in fact that's true. But it is absolutely wrong to call this passivity. The France of Vichy participated actively in antisemist actions and roundups such as the razzia of Vel d'Hiv in 1942 in Paris when thousands of Jews were arrested by the FRENCH police to be deported into concentration camps.

Finally, the state of France has accepted the fact of an ACTIVE collaboration with Germany, especially under Jacques Chirac as president. It was a long process which actually began in the late 80s with the first trials against French politicians who were accused of crimes against humanity they committed during the German occupation and this process is far from an end.

Why divisions instead of actual strengths?

In the battle box it tells how many divisions sides had. Great, but what has that to do with anything? It's the number of men, not divisions what matters. It's irrelevant not only about the strenghts, but also to comparison between the troops, since sizes of divisions can differ greatly. I'm remembering seeing numbers 3,1 million Axis vs 3,3 million French sometimes before, what about returning it to that or some else troop number? Wikinist 20:04, 28 April 2007 (UTC)

Well, the division number is of course at itself very relevant — you want to know how many manoeuvre units there were and doubling the size of a division by adding infantry will certainly not double its fighting power: apart from the operational aspect there's the simple fact that much of that power resides in its artillery. However, it is of course best to give both numbers. Immediately the problem poses itself which number to choose. All Allied soldiers in France and the Low Countries versus all Germans crossing the border? But then the Allied number is misleadingly high — above six million — and we have no good data on the German number. Or perhaps we should turn again to the divisions and count how many men are in them? But then the overall numbers are too low as relevant support troops are excluded — and anyway we have no good data using that criterion either. The usual solution has been to give all Germans "in the West" versus the complete BEF and Belgian and Dutch armies — and adding the French troops on the "North-East" front. The numbers obtained this way are still not very useful and will obscure two basic yet contradictory facts: on the one hand that the number of German fighting troops was higher than the Allied one; on the other hand that fewer Germans actually participated in the fighting. So put no faith in total numbers ;o).--MWAK 05:43, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

The divisions actually give a pretty good idea of the situation. There was little difference in the ration or rifle strength of French or German divisions (British were certainly also very similar in rifle strength, idem Belgian). The only major difference between the Germans and Allies is that the Allies had a large number of non divisional Artillery Regiments and smaller infantry formations (British MG battalions, French separate Infantry Regiments of various types etc.)... , but that didn't add much more fighting power. Though to note, the total numbers also seem to be listed in the infobox.--Caranorn 11:58, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

Decisive Axis Victory?

Shouldn't this be a decisive German Victory? As the only other Axis Power, Italy, did not declare war until 10th June with the decisive fighting already over, and even then made virtually zero impact on the campaign.

Dapi89 20:14, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

Just make it "Axis victory" and this problem goes away. Haber 21:19, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

No, it should be called a decisive victory, meaning the adversary capitulated.--MWAK 04:31, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

I'd definitelly agree on decisive with France, Belgium and the Netherlands mostly (all contributed to the war later on, but far less then in 1939/40) knocked out of the war.--Caranorn 12:11, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

So then do you want "German" or "Axis"? The French certainly thought the backstab was decisive, so I say let's leave it as "Decisive Axis Victory". Haber 12:55, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Hi guys. My orginal question was not about the 'decisive' element but the swapping of 'Axis' for 'German' for the reasons I mentioned above!!! What say you?Dapi89 11:02, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

I have put in German for now, but I'm sure someone else will take it out.Dapi89 11:10, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

Actually no, makes sense, so I hope it stays that way.--Caranorn 11:45, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

Saar Offensive speculations

Just a quick note. I'm not sure where the number of 98 French Divisions comes from. I assume that these are all the French Divisions and Divisional Equivalents (fortress units) present in France at that date. Though even for that the number of 98 seems rather high. In any case, following the differentiation between Reserve and Regular (really between 1. Welle and successive mobilization classes) for the Germans I did the same for the French. The number of 28 are all the French Regular (d'active) Divisions formed by that date (actually I forgot the three Light Chasseurs and Infantry Divisions, but I'm unsure of their date of formation anyhow), regardless of their location within France. It should be noted that the vast mass of French Reserve Divisions were not operational by this date, the 2nd wave (Réserve B) ones weren't even fully combat ready by May 10 1940.--Caranorn 13:48, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

First of all, by mentioning Keitel's remark, I didn't mean I personally agree with his opinion :o). The point however, is undeniably often made in the literature, together with the analysis that only eleven German divions were active units, as an indication for the presumed true disparity of forces. The number of 98 seems to be given as the full number of every existing division in France. Shirer has the number of 85 for the North East, together with this picture of the situation in his Fall of the Third Republic:

The French had an overwhelming superiority in men, guns and tanks. Against their fully armed 85 divisions the Germans had 34, all but 11 of which were reserve units with little training and lacking adequate arms, munition and transport. All the Panzer divisions, all the motorized divisions, had been reserved for Poland. On September 10 some nine more reserve divisions were added but they would have been of little value against a serious attack.

In reality of course there was another active division present in the West outside of the direct Heeresgruppe C area and ten of the divisions were fully trained 2. Welle, probably the equal of any French infantry division in fighting power, so the number of useful divisions was at least 22. It's true that nominally the mobilised French divisions present had a majority of men having at some time in the past completed their training, but as you indicated, the B divisions really needed to be completely retrained — apart from the low fighting power inherent in the high average age of their conscripts. Even then we cannot conclude a 1:3 ratio was present (even when disregarding the low readiness problem) as only a limited French force could be deployed; 1:2 is more realistic, hardly "overwhelming", given the strength of the German fortification zone, in which tanks would have been of little value. A full-scale French offensive would probably not have attained a strategic breakthrough and only resulted in sacrificing hundreds of thousands of men for a limited territorial gain in the southern Rhineland. Maybe with the benefit of hindsight we might assume that Hitler would have squandered his ammunition reserves on reconquering the ground lost, perhaps fatefully delaying a 1940 offensive. This might have saved France in 1940, but not Poland in 1939 :o).

What we need is a good reference to balance Keitel's view...--MWAK 14:27, 13 May 2007 (UTC)

ending the Phoney War?

The article begins with "executed from 10 May 1940, which ended the Phoney War". What about the invasion of Norway? It was not phoney and it took place earlier. 85.227.226.168 16:05, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Well, it ended the Phoney War in the main theatre. Scandinavia and the naval actions are just marginal, no? ;o)--MWAK 05:20, 4 June 2007 (UTC)

Too little info on the Luftwaffe's contribution

I think there should be more info on the aboves contribution. The article mentions the Blitzkrieg theory in one section and does not mention the Luftwaffe at all. I can find onlt two other references to its participation in the rest of the article. I will go about inputting more information on this subject as the Luftwaffe was a key component in the Blitzkrieg battleplan.Dapi89 18:34, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Well, on the operational level, there was one point in the campaign where the Luftwaffe's actions were truly decisive: the breaking of the French front at Sedan. Also the surrender of the Dutch forces was brought about by the bombing of Rotterdam. In the other actions, they were one factor among many. They contributed, like armour, infantry and artillery did, but in contrast to the movements of army units on the ground, mentioning their effort in terms of the number of sorties made or tonnage of explosives dropped, would add too much detail to the very general description of events we are forced to limit ourselves to.

As regards the Luftwaffe forming part of Blitzkrieg theory, we have to be very careful. It was no part of an official Blitzkrieg doctrine as no such doctrine existed in the first place. The role of the Luftwaffe as "flying artillery" compensating the lack of artillery support caused by the armour executing very deep and swift strategic penetrations, was attributed to it by later writers, creating a sort of idealised version of what they thought Blitzkrieg should be like. At the time such deep penetrations were considered a radical, even subversive, idea and anyway, the artillery was expected too simply keep up as it indeed often did. Reading Guderian we never get the impression he somehow considered close air support to be a necessary condition for success (to him reconnaissance and battlefield interdiction seemed the most important roles for air power). During the actual events, it sometimes of course was. But this was more the exception than the rule: in practice, the more "deep" and fluid a battle was, the less the chance of any effective air support materialising would be, as radio communications were unreliable and target acquisition (not to mention bombing precision...) was very poor. It was not as if armour commanders constantly had a swarm of Stukas circling above their heads they could direct at will to immediately obliterate the enemy. In a really fluid battle you couldn't afford to sit waiting for the bombers to appear and perhaps hit anything relevant; on the other hand you really didn't need them as in those conditions you were supposed to defeat the enemy primarily by manoeuvre, not fire power. The main effect the Luftwaffe had after 15 May consisted in the disruption of transport and increasing the general fear and confusion.

A quite different question is that of the general air war. The article certainly should have a chapter about how the respective airforces fared while fighting each other.--MWAK 06:41, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Well that last point was really the point I was making. The Luftwaffe's victory in the Skies and contribution to ground operations isn't really discussed in depth. It should be, it was decisive. The Luftwaffe did provide an air blanket over the Heer and Panzers and were responsible for the decimation of the Enemy airforces. The Stuka units were equipped with good air-to-ground communications and it was possible for commanders to "call up" and ask for assistance when they encountered heavy or large concentrations of enemy forces. This ability is well recorded in literature relating to the history of the Stuka Geschwaders. As you have mentioned Guderian did consider air-power as important, therefore it has to be said that air-power was a decisive element in the campaign, therefore certainly a major cog in the battle plan. Guderian as most Army commanders do, tend to play down the significance of air power. Rommel in particular was aware of this during the North African campaign. He became frustrated at the lack of co-operation between Luftwaffe and Army forces. The importance of air support became clear when the Wehrmacht began lose it from 1942 onwards. The main effort of the Luftwaffe was not so much the disruption of transport post May 15, but the continued suppression of enemy airpower and ground attack duties - of course related to the Blitzkrieg theory. The percentage of sorties that were direct ground support, i.e ground attack, is not really important, the disruption of supplies is just as critical. Dapi89 11:44, 9 July 2007 (UTC).

In any case it is a good thing this aspect is better treated :o). Of course the air cover provided, though important, should be seen in relation to the offensive power of the Allied tactical bomber force, which was rather limited. Perhaps you could add some data to the article about the relative sortie rates between the nations — and also some indication of average dayly total sorties by German Ju 87s would be very informative to the reader too!--MWAK 19:23, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Agree with that, it must be included. Okay. I have considerable info on this.Dapi89 20:02, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Ive added the requested info. I have a total number of Allied sorties for 10-15 May but am not sure were best to put it. I'll add some more on the final destruction of the Armee de l'Air during Fall Rot.Dapi89 22:17, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

This contribution was very valuable! Perhaps the sortie numbers could be put into a special chapter at the end, outling the performance of the main airforces, together with their victory and loss rates over the entire campaign. Exact numbers are precisely the thing an encyclopedia should offer! Or perhaps you might even consider to write a separate article about it?--MWAK 05:02, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

I had thought about this, but I didn't want to write a chapter of airforce stats and how they fought the air war, but rather to mold it with the other sections and relate it to the ground campaign as well. I also refrained as I have a habbit of adding too much info. I think this part would be best included at the end of the Fall Rot section. I also read somewhere that inputting statistics is against wiki policy.Dapi89 16:37, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Well if an article would be become a purely statistical datalist, that would be a problem. But some nice tables wouldn't hurt.--MWAK 05:31, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

Defensive mentality

Copied from WP:RD/H for further processing. --Ghirla^-трёп- 14:23, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

Be careful of some of the details in the article on the Military History of France, Taraborn. The Maginot Line did not 'sucessfully hold off the German attacks in 1940': it was totally by-passed by Manstein's sweep to the west. Army Group C, the weakest of the three German battle formations, was specifically allocated to act as a decoy force, to pin down the enemy, and deflect from the offensive operations to the north-west of the line. Even so, the 1st, 7th and 16th German armies succesfully broke through the French defences at several points. By mid-June the fabled Maginot Line was just as porous as the rest of the French defences.

Maginot also has some wider relevance to your main question, being a concrete expression (literally!) of the 'defensive mentality' that had emerged in France in the 1930s. France had made a huge sacrifice during the Great War, at places like Verdun, which had bleed the country to near death. With a smaller population than Germany, the proportional losses were all the greater. The full realisation of the terrible cost only began to emerge in the 1920s. One response was to create the 'Maginot Shield'. Originally this was really only to safeguard the privinces of Alsace Lorraine, the point where it was always to be strongest, though it was later extended, to a highly ineffectual extent, all the way to the Channel. In essence it was a nineteenth century solution to a twentieth century problem, and one that created the illusion of invulnerability.

German tactics were, indeed, highly important in 1940; and it seems reasonably certain that a repeat of the old Schlieffen Plan would have succeeded just as brilliantly in 1940 as the offensive that was actually put in operation. Why? Was it because the German Army was stronger? No, it was not. It was because the Germans had learned the lessons of 1918, when their army had been broken in the west by a combination of infantry, armoured and air attacks, and the French had not. The German response was Blitzkrieg. In terms of the number of tanks at their disposal, they were no stronger than the French; but their armour was concentrated in Panzer Divisions, intended to operate independently from the infantry as a cutting spearhead, whereas French armour was spread loosely across the whole army, wasted in the task of infantry support. German airpower-particularly the Stuka dive bombers-was used in the form of aerial artillery, supporting ground advances by destroying enemy bases in the line of attack. The whole thing was devastatingly effective.

Finally, we should should not neglect the internal political divisions within France, which deepened in bitterness throughout the 1930s, and contributed to a defeatist mentality. Lacking political and military leadership of the highest order the Third Republic might be said to have willed itself to death, reflected very much in the attitude of men like Philippe Petain. Defeat was born on the inside. Clio the Muse 01:17, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

OK, allow me to comment :o):

1. There really was nothing "outdated" in 1940 about the concept of a fortification line. Building one was an efficient investment, one of the reasons the Germans too invested heavily in fortifications.
2. What however most certainly ís outdated in 2007 is the narrative that the silly French "didn't learn the lessons of 1918" whereas those perky Germans did. Both the French and the German tactical doctrines were modern offshoots of the 19th century Bewegungskrieg concept. The main difference was that the French emphasized planning, high levels of control and the use of armour, while the Germans put their faith in flexibility, high quality of command at the lower level and infantry. So basically 1940 was a battle of Bataille Méthodique against Auftragstaktik. Which method was best, strongly depended on the strategic situation. It is highly doubtful a frontal attack through central Belgium would have resulted in a decisive German victory. The French had thoroughly planned for such a battle, there would have been little room for German initiative and the unarmoured German infantry would have been very vulnerable given the high fire power density. The typical outcome would have been a battle of attrition, with the Germans sacrificing their best troops for a limited territorial gain. This consideration was of course precisely the reason Von Manstein devised a different strategy. Only this new strategy allowed for a chain of events that ended in something we today would describe as "Blitzkrieg". For the German High Command this was the unintended outcome however ; Blitzkrieg was not the official doctrine and Halder's changes to Von Manstein's plan would have precluded any Blitzkrieg to take place, were it not for the outright insubordination by the German armour commanders.
3. The fact that the French in 1940 committed more modern tanks to battle than the Germans did, even though their army was a third smaller, has always been very embarrassing to the theory that the German Army would have been organised according to the Blitzkrieg concept. To explain it away recourse is made to caricature, what we may call the Concentration Myth: the Germans deliberately concentrated their tanks into armoured divisions whereas the French distributed theirs among the infantry. The real explanation is very simple: the German Army as a whole, contrary to the French, didn't consider tanks to be all that important. They believed in the superb training of their elite infantry units. That was why so few tanks were built in the first place. These were nevertheless divided among the Panzertruppe, the Infantry and the Cavalry. But the infantry armoured brigades were disbanded in 1939 without too much protest as they were equipped with inferior light vehicles anyway and the Cavalry Light Divisions were renamed armoured divisions. But this was mainly for organisational reasons — a lack of trained tank crews, reducing overhead — and did not reflect some fundamental doctrinal change. And is it true the French did not concentrate their tanks? Not really. Ultimately about 2000 modern French tanks would be employed by mechanised or motorised units of divisional strength, including the matériel reserves allocated, against 2700 German tanks. Not that great a disparity. And even the independent armoured brigades, the sixteen Groupements, were allocated at army level and often fought alongside the armoured divisions. Normal infantry units never had an organic armour component.
4. In reality the Germans won because they deconcentrated and the French concentrated — not tanks but trucks. Many German trucks were divided among the regular infantry divisions and this gave them a superior tactical mobility in the encounter fight. The French in fact had a larger number of special motorised divisions than the Germans!
5. Yes, many French were defensive and defaitist. But defaitism was the prevalent attitude in Germany also: people and army command were very pessimistic about the situation. The defender usually wins but the Germans had no choice but to attack. And Germany had no lack of internal divisions also, with the chief of staff carrying a revolver to shoot the head of state if necessary! Hitler was not a strong war leader but a neurotic, anxious and insecure amateur, who at times was close to ruining the entire campaign. And if France would have had a strong leadership, what exactly could it have done differently? Does political strength confer the magical ability to predict the enemy strategy? Also it should be remembered that the decision to advance into central Belgium was taken for offensive reasons, to make possible a large Allied offensive in 1941, for which purpose it was planned to triple the number of armoured divisions.--MWAK 19:44, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

Polish units and OOB musings

Please see my question at Talk:Order of battle for the Battle of France.-- _{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk}  19:07, 31 July 2007 (UTC)

Dutch Airforce

Actually looking at the article once more I find that claim of 144 Dutch Combat Aircraft. I had mistakenly interpreted the airforce to have only some 63 airplanes of which 43 were certainly monoplanes ([4]). Now that I've looked at that site once more I find there were 77 additional aircraft under the Inspector of Military Aircraft adding up to 150 (so almost identical to the book source), but none of those seem to be operational combat aircraft. I will leave it to someone else to decide whether it's worthwhile mentioning the majority of planes as biplanes or not (listing the 63 combat planes might be of greater importance).--Caranorn 21:30, 8 August 2007 (UTC)

Just checked the Belgian Airforce, this only seems to list combat (fighter, bomber, reconnaissance and observation) aircraft (the number roughly adds up to those listed under this link [5]) and ignore training aircraft. Does the booksource for the Dutch Airforce provide a breakdown that would allow applying a same standard here?--Caranorn 21:36, 8 August 2007 (UTC)

Most of the planes under the administration of the inspectorate were more or less operational — and you have forgotten the Navy planes. So if we include all military aircraft present, the majority of these indeed consisted of biplanes. Nevertheless, it seems incorrect to stress this point too much as it suggests that most of the dogfights were between aircraft of an extreme technological inequality, whereas in fact the core of the Dutch fighter squadrons was equippped with relatively modern planes.

As regards the "stalemate" issue: though I personally tend to agree with Rex that this was a decisive cause for the bombing, the problem is that the literature is not in consensus about this subject. So in the very short section we must by necessity dedicate to it, it would be incorrect to make such a clear choice.--MWAK 06:06, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

No matter with which the core figher core was equiped, this article talks about the destruction of the Dutch airforce, and a 'mere' 332 sorties , well who flew those sorties? The modern ones or the aiforce as a whole? If the literature is not in concensus, then it's very simple; provide both/multiple views.Rex 09:24, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

You have to understand the vast majority of combat sorties does not result in any combat. Planes take off, fly around and land — having achieved nothing. Most of the Dutch aircraft being shot down were easy prey by the mere fact they were reconnaissance aircraft or light bombers. That they were also biplanes made them, if anything, less vulnerable because such a configuration increases manoeuvrability.

Of course we could give both views but then the question arises why we would need to mention this aspect at all in such a short account if its relevance is contended... I really have to make good on my promise to finish the Battle of the Netherlands article :o).--MWAK 10:44, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

I understand the concept of sorties, and I'd rather be in a spitfire than a Fokker D1. The idea that biplanes were superior in combat vs the German fighters strikes me as total and complete nonsense. Of course it should be mentioned. If every contested matter would be left out because of that, we'd have very little to talk about would we?Rex 11:19, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

Well, the Fokker D.I is a WW1 plane. However, until the middle of the thirties combat aircraft would often be biplanes; the last models were not all that bad — at least not as bad as Fokker D.I :o) — compared to the German fighters. Obviously I do not claim that biplanes were superior in combat. However, your point seems to be that, while normal Dutch fighters were not biplanes, most Dutch aircraft in action in May 1940 were of this type and that therefore this fact merits mention in order to point out the Dutch technological inferiority. My point is that those biplanes weren't fighters but reconnaissance aircraft/light bombers that had no chance whatsoever in a dogfight against German fighters, nor could outrun them and that thus could only survive by refusing battle; and that being a biplane certainly helps to achieve this because it makes a plane more manoeuvrable. The bit of speed these underpowered aircraft would have gained by having been built in a monoplane configuration would have availed them nothing.

The contested interpretation of the Bombing of Rotterdam certainly should be discussed; but it has its natural place in the subarticles. I've tried to keep the account of this article as close to consensus as possible, as it would have to be tripled in length if it was unfolded along both all the many traditional and revisionist views. Of course the section about the Netherlands is only a tiny part of this problem, but every bit helps ;o).--MWAK 12:20, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

Just to answer the question posted by Rex Germanus, between 10 May - 14 May the Dutch flew 195 Fighter sorties, 115 Recon sorties whilst just 22 bomber missions took place. of the 144 aircraft that were in service, 125 were serviceable. Of 110 lost in combat, 72 were destroyed in air-to-air combat, the others on the ground claiming 38 German aircraft in return. It is unclear, and I don't believe there is a source, that can tell us how many sorties were flown by which aircraft. The 332 sorties mentioned are only for the ML, and not any other branch of the armed forces. The 144 number is a front line strength number for combat aircraft only.Dapi89 17:09, 9 August 2007 (UTC).

French air force losses

Dapi89 was looking for French aviation losses for the campaign, so here are figures from J. & P. Martin's Ils étaient là: l'armée de l'Air septembre 39 - juin 40, Aéro-Editions, 2001, ISBN 2-9514567-2-7:

Armée de l'air losses, frontline units, from 3rd sept. 1939 to 24th June 1940

	to NME aircraft	to AAA	by accident	total
Fighters	353	45	69	467
Bombers	73	93	60	226
Recon.	94	62	45	201
Total	520	200	174	894

Armée de l'air only - Aéronautique navale not included. Local defense patrol, foreign based, training or non-combatant units not included. Aircraft destroyed on the ground or abandoned not included. Detail by aircraft type available. PpPachy 20:10, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

I already had these but thanks anyway. I didnt think it appropriate for the article. But perhaps they should be included as well as a complete break down of the total number of sorties by each type (I mean fighter/ bomber etc). The total number of losses included in the Fall Rot section do include captured and abandoned machines that were initialy combat ready.Dapi89 13:59, 10 August 2007 (UTC).

By the way it seems this author has not got the exact figures correct. The losses he presents from September '39 to Jun '40 are lower than the ones lost during the battle of May-Jun 1940! Hooton Luftwaffe at war: Blitzkrieg in the West on p90 and Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague in A History of french Military Aviation p360-361 both state that the French lost 174 to AA Fire. The exact numbers should be mentioned. When losses are concerned I'm always suspicious of exact numbers like "200" which prompts me to check, especially losses.

The total estimtes included are substantially higher than the ones quoted here. The figure of 520 lost in combat apperas to far too low. Counting thos lost in air-to-air combat, destroyed on the ground and captured (all of which should be included) amounts to 1,100, of which 700 were on the ground. 420 were lost too all causes alone in the first nine days.Dapi89 16:31, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

Surrender?

"France formally surrendered to the German armed forces on 25 June in the same railroad car at Compiègne that Germany in 1918 had been forced to surrender in. "

This isn't correct, is it? France didn't sign a surrender, it signed an armistice providing for its country's continued independence, yes? For that matter, Germany also had signed an armistice in 1918, I believe. Pirate Dan 20:45, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

In principle you're right. However, the armistice also entailed the capitulation of all surrounded troops. Indeed in 1918 also Germany signed an armistice. The continued independence of France was implicit in the armistice, but might also have been in a full capitulation: there is no necessary connection.--MWAK 05:45, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

There is no "surrender document " as was written in a previous version. It's much more than a semantic problem. If a surrender document had been signed, this was a "capitulation" of the French Army in France, which implied that the french gvt, army etc could fight in Africa,in GB, on seas etc. To the contrary, the new authorities of France (Petain and his clique) choose an "armistice" signed by a government, not the Army, which implied there will be no more French fighting, which was the Nazi objective.(contrib off-Wiki by a French friend)--Mrg3105 (talk) 09:13, 20 December 2007 (UTC)

Operation Fall Rot and the issue of summary style

There is a separate article, Operation Fall Rot, which I'd redirect to the June: Fall Rot, France section of this article, except that:

• That would create a number of double redirects to be fixed
• More importantly, this article (Battle of France) is just too long. It would make more sense to shorten the June: Fall Rot, France section and use the "main" template to direct readers to a separate article, and to do the same for other parts of this article as well.

I've got other priorities, so I'm not going to do anything on this except post it here as a suggestion and perhaps a starting point for discussion of the length of the article. -- John Broughton (♫♫) —Preceding signed but undated comment was added at 17:09, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

Yes, the present inadequacy of Operation Fall Rot might almost induce one into turning it into a redirect and, yes, some reflection will convince anyone that it would be even better if the Fall Rot article would be longer than the section in this article. The way forward is however to lengthen the Fall Rot article, not to shorten this one.

The subject matter of Battle of France is extraordinarily complex and controversial. We might condense the article but this will seriously decrease intelligibility. Worse, if the level of detail is insufficient, people will no longer be able to understand how modern research has changed the scientific consensus about the course of events. They will immediately begin to adapt the résumés to make them conform to more popular views, starting an endless series of edit wars. Also, with enough detail we can give a narrative largely consisting of uncontested facts that doesn't need a constant commentary about how these are interpreted according to the different schools of thought. Should we make the sections more or less like excerpts we would for reasons of NPOV be forced to indicate how the several sides: traditional, popular, professional, revisionist, tend to conclude what "really happened in short". The result would only be marginally shorter — and a confusing jumble of opinion, lacking the fact that this opinion is about.

In time, the several subarticles: Battle of the Netherlands, Battle of Belgium, Sedan, Dunkirk, Fall Rot, The Italian Invasion, The Air War of 1940, German Strategy, Allied Strategy, The Order of Battle etc., etc. will all reach a size of 70 Kb or so — and then this one will not seem so long.--MWAK 19:36, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

Good Article Reassessment

This article has been reviewed as part of Wikipedia:WikiProject Good articles/Project quality task force for GA sweeps. I think the article currently doesn't meet the requirements of the Good article criteria concerning sourcing. Although the article is well-sourced in many areas, other areas are lacking. For that reason, I have listed the article at Good article reassessment to get a better consensus on the article's status. Issues needing to be address are listed there. Please join the discussion to see how the article could be improved and prevent delisting. If you have any questions about the reassessement, leave me a message on my talk page and I'll get back to you as soon as I can. Regards, --Nehrams2020 06:34, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

"First historical use of blitzkrieg"

Inaccurate. The first historical reference to blitzkrieg principles put in practice was the high mobility-minded Mongol invasion of Khwarezmia. Robert Greene's work, The 33 Strategies of War, references it in detail when speaking on the speed-and-suddenness blitzkrieg strategy itself, and therein comparing it to the events of 10 May - 5 June 1940. --Chr.K. (talk) 06:38, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

We can go back even much further in history to find principles of Blitzkrieg. But there is a major school of thought that claims this campaign was the first instance of the real thing. The section of course needs major rewrite.--MWAK (talk) 08:31, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

Well Historian Basil Liddell Hart concluded "Poland was a full demonstration of the Blitzkrieg theory", and Liddell Hart was an advocate of the fast moving limited war in the 1920s. I have added that text and citation to the Polish Campaign articleDapi89 (talk) 13:27, 23 December 2007 (UTC).